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ARIZONA’S “ZOMBIE” URANIUM MINES: 
LAX REGULATIONS THREATEN  
LOS ANGELES TAP WATER 
DAVID IANNELLA* 
Abstract: In Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 
was not required to approve a new plan of operations before allowing a urani-
um mine to resume production after nearly two decades of cessation. The 
court reasoned that the reopening of an abandoned mine did not constitute the 
requisite major federal action required to trigger an environmental analysis 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). This Comment argues 
that although the Ninth Circuit correctly affirmed that the BLM complied with 
NEPA, the ruling exposes an environmentally dangerous loophole that re-
quires statutory revisions. The court’s holding essentially permits mining op-
erators to restart production at mines dormant for decades without undertaking 
any new environmental reviews. The determination of whether a mine poses a 
significant threat to the environment is based upon an assessment that could 
potentially date back several decades. 
INTRODUCTION 
If you are one of the almost four million people living in Los Angeles, 
the glass of tap water that you sip before bed likely originates from the Col-
orado River.1 Not only does the Colorado River provide water to those in 
California, but it also hydrates one in twelve Americans, or nearly twenty-
seven million people.2 Perhaps surprisingly, the edges of the Colorado Riv-
er are lined by some of the most uranium-rich deposits in the nation.3 The 
location of the uranium ore along the Colorado presents a complex dichot-
omy.4 Uranium is a mineral that could solve the nation’s dependency on 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014. 
 1 See Abrahm Lustgarten & David Hasemyer, Colorado River May Face Fight of Its Life, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Dec. 21, 2008), http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2008/dec/21/1n21
colorado211057-colorado-river-may-face-fight-I, available at http://perma.cc/TK5U-WTV5 (dis-
cussing the reliance of several states, including California, on the Colorado River for tap water). 
 2 See id. 
 3 Laurel Morales, Tribes, Enviros Fight Uranium Mining Near Grand Canyon, KPBS (June 3, 
2013), http://www.kpbs.org/news/2013/jun/03/tribes-enviros-fight-uranium-mining-grand-canyon, 
available at http://perma.cc/4YH7-FABC. 
 4 See Lustgarten & Hasemyer, supra note 1. 
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foreign oil, but it is toxic and could threaten the major water supply of the 
Southwestern United States.5 
While uranium mines have sprinkled the lands around the Grand Can-
yon for decades, higher ore prices in the global markets have drawn many 
operators back to the mines that they abandoned years ago.6 Since the 
1950s, when the first boom of hopeful prospectors trekked to the American 
Southwest to strike it rich, fluctuations in the economic feasibility of main-
taining a uranium mine drove many operators off their once-active claims.7 
A slew of mines that ceased production due to a drop in demand, colloquial-
ly referred to as “zombie mines,” have recently been resurrected and are 
again conducting operations.8 Restarting production at inactive mines has not 
only brought machinery and pollutants back to the Grand Canyon region, but 
it has also initiated a host of lawsuits aimed at protecting federal public 
lands.9 
Denison Corporation’s Arizona 1 Mine (“Arizona 1”), located six-and-
one-half miles north of Grand Canyon National Park in Mohave County, 
Arizona, is one example of a uranium mine facing legal challenges.10 After 
a period of about fourteen years of inactivity, the mine’s operators stated 
their intention to resume operations in 2007.11 Two years later, the mine 
reopened under a plan of operations and an environmental assessment ap-
                                                                                                                           
 5 See id. The U.S. Geological Survey has expressed its position that uranium mining near the 
Grand Canyon might result in radioactive materials seeping into groundwater that flows into the 
Colorado River. Opening Brief for Appellants at 8, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, 706 
F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-17843). 
 6 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 2012 URANIUM MARKETING ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2013), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/uranium/marketing/pdf/2012umar.pdf and http://perma.cc/V4U7-
6MLG; Morales, supra note 3. 
 7 See Brett T. Bunkall, The Uranium Mining and Milling Industry in Utah, 26 J. LAND RE-
SOURCES & ENVTL. L. 375, 375–76 (2006); Uranium Mining Overview, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Mining-of-Uranium/Uranium-Mining-
Overview/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/6KX4-YFL7 (discussing a 
decline in the number of U.S. uranium mines as well as a recent resurgence because of higher 
uranium prices). 
 8 See, e.g., Mary Shinn, Appeals Court Upholds Reopening of Uranium Mine Near Grand 
Canyon, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (Feb. 5, 2013), http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2013/02/05/ 
appeals-court-upholds-reopening-of-uranium-mine-near-grand-canyon/#ixzz2hk3vyXvz, availa-
ble at http://perma.cc/8L28-6K9H. A wildlands campaign director at the Center for Biological 
Diversity expressed concern that “[t]hey are basically zombie mines that will live perpetually 
without ever being subject to new environmental reviews.” Id. 
 9 See, e.g., Opening Brief for Appellants, supra note 5, at 9 (discussing the harmful effects of 
uranium mining around the Grand Canyon); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1088. Aban-
doned mines themselves pose an environmental hazard. See S. REP. NO. 109-351, at 1 (2006) (“It 
is estimated that there are as many as 500,000 abandoned hardrock mines throughout the United 
States . . . . The former U.S. Bureau of Mines estimated that 12,000 stream miles and 180,000 
acres of lakes in the West have been impacted by acid mine drainage.”). 
 10 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1088. 
 11 Id. at 1089. 
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proved by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM),12 which was regulated 
by environmental policy nearly two decades old.13 Consequently, the Center 
for Biological Diversity sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Denison 
Corporation (“Denison”) from operating under the original 1988 plan of 
operations.14 The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona rejected the 
plaintiff’s request for an injunction, giving Denison the green light to extract 
ore from its Canyon-side mine.15 
By allowing Arizona 1 to resume operations in 2009, the BLM refused 
to consider potential environmental impacts under present-day standards.16 
Instead, the agency held Denison to the same standards that governed the 
mining industry back in the 1980s.17 No new environmental assessment was 
required, nor was one prepared.18 While Denison and other mining operators 
were pleased by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s finding in 
Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar that approval of a new plan was 
not required before production could recommence at the decades dormant 
mine, the ruling will most likely cause problems for those in Los Angeles 
who continue to consume tap water originating from the adjacently located 
Colorado River.19 This Comment argues that although the Ninth Circuit cor-
rectly affirmed that the Secretary of the Interior and the BLM complied 
with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Federal Land Pol-
icy and Management Act (FLPMA), and the BLM’s own regulations, the 
court’s ruling exposes a dangerous environmental loophole that requires 
statutory revisions.20 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1988, Energy Fuels Nuclear (“Energy Fuels”) sought approval from 
the BLM to mine uranium from the Arizona 1 claim and submitted a pro-
posed plan of operations to the agency prior to developing the Mohave 
County site.21 After reviewing Energy Fuels’ plan, the BLM prepared a de-
                                                                                                                           
 12 See generally The Bureau of Land Management: Who We Are, What We Do, BUREAU OF 
LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/About_BLM.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013), 
available at http://perma.cc/A8D9-BFYP (detailing Congress’s founding of the agency to manage 
federal public lands). 
 13 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1089. 
 14 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, 28–29, Ctr. for Biological Diver-
sity v. Salazar, 791 F. Supp. 2d 687 (D. Ariz. 2011) (No. 09CV08207) (requesting that the court 
vacate and set aside approval by the BLM to allow operations at the Arizona 1 mine to continue). 
 15 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1089. 
 16 See id. at 1095. 
 17 See Shinn, supra note 8. 
 18 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1095. 
 19 See Shinn, supra note 8; Lustgarten & Hasemyer, supra note 1. 
 20 See Shinn, supra note 8. 
 21 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1088. 
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tailed public statement, commonly known as an environmental assessment 
(EA), pursuant to NEPA to assess the mine’s potential effects on the envi-
ronment.22 Ultimately, the BLM approved the Arizona 1 mine under FLPMA, 
concluding the mine would not cause “undue or unnecessary degradation of 
public lands” or “significantly affect the quality of the human environ-
ment.”23 Energy Fuels’ plan also contained an interim plan in the event of 
an unanticipated shutdown at the mine.24 
After BLM’s approval, Energy Fuels began developing Arizona 1, but 
eventually halted operations in 1992 after a drastic drop in uranium prices 
coupled with ongoing bankruptcy proceedings.25 Consequently, Energy Fuels 
placed the mine on “standby and interim management status” as outlined in 
the 1988 BLM-approved plan.26 With Arizona 1 still inoperable in 1997, 
International Uranium Corporation acquired ownership of the mine.27 Ten 
years later in 2007, International Uranium Corporation merged with Den-
ison.28 At the time of the merger, production at the mine remained on 
hold.29 
Throughout the period of inactivity at Arizona 1, the mine was man-
aged under the 1988 plan of operations and the interim plan found therein.30 
Pursuant to the BLM’s own regulations,31 the agency conducted inspections 
at Arizona 1 while the mine was inactive.32 Eventually, in 2007, economic 
prospects for the mining industry brightened as the price of uranium in-
creased.33 As a result, Denison sought Aquifer Protection and Air Quality 
Control permits from the State of Arizona in preparation to reopen Arizona 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See Federal Appellees’ Response Brief at 11–12, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d 
1085 (No. 11-17843). The BLM considered the mine’s potential impact to “air, surface water, and 
groundwater, as well as the potential radiogenic impacts of mining operations, ore stockpiles, and 
ore transport.” Id. at 12–13 (internal citations omitted). 
 23 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1088, 1091–92. See generally 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) 
(2006) (requiring the Secretary of the Interior to take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary 
or undue degradation of federal lands). 
 24 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1088. 
 25 Plaintiffs’ Response to Motion to Intervene at 3, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 791 F. Supp. 
2d 687 (No. 3:09-cv-08207-DGC). 
 26 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1088. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See id. 
 29 See id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 3809 (2012) (discussing the duties of the BLM to prevent the unnec-
essary or undue degradation of public lands). 
 32 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1088. 
 33 See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 6, at 3. The weighted-average price of uranium 
purchased by owners and operators of U.S. civilian nuclear power reactors increased from approx-
imately $10 per pound of triuranium octoxide in 2002 to in excess of $40 per pound in 2007. See 
id. 
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1.34 Denison also increased its financial guarantee with the BLM and the 
Arizona Department of Environmental Equality.35 
Two years later in November 2009, Denison continued to conduct final 
preparations to reopen Arizona 1.36 In anticipation of the mine’s reopening, 
the Center for Biological Diversity, Grand Canyon Trust, Sierra Club, Kaibab 
Band of Paiute Indians, and the Havasupai Tribe filed a complaint in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Arizona alleging that Energy Fuels’ 1988 
plan of operations had become ineffective due to the mine’s extended period 
of inactivity.37 Despite the pending litigation, Arizona 1 was conducting op-
erations by the end of the year.38 In an effort to prevent further operation at 
Arizona 1, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction.39 
The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion and issued an order of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, 
ruling that the BLM fulfilled its duties when it approved the 1988 plan.40 The 
district court held that the plaintiffs had standing to maintain their claims un-
der NEPA, but the agency’s decision to allow Arizona 1 to reopen under the 
1988 plan was not arbitrary and capricious.41 The court also held that a new 
or supplemental EIS was not required because neither BLM’s mere moni-
toring of the mine while it was inactive nor the agency’s decision to in-
crease the reclamation bond amount constituted “major federal actions” un-
der NEPA.42 Lastly, the court held that BLM’s decision to apply a categori-
cal exclusion under NEPA for the issuance of a gravel permit, which was 
necessary to maintain an access road at the mine, was arbitrary and capri-
cious.43 The court remanded the gravel permit issue to the BLM and re-
quired the agency to provide a more complete explanation of the categorical 
exclusion determination.44 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1089. 
 35 Id. at 1089, 1096. 
 36 Id. at 1089. 
 37 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 14, at 2–3 (claiming that 
the plan of operations at the Arizona 1 mine “expired by its own terms” and is therefore no longer 
in effect). In contending that the mine’s extended period of dormancy has rendered the 1988 plan 
of operations ineffective, the plaintiffs relied on 43 C.F.R. § 3809.423, which states that a plan 
remains in effect “as long as . . . [a mining operator is] conducting operations.” See Plaintiffs’ 
Response to Motion to Intervene, supra note 25, at 3–4. 
 38 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1089. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 705. 
 41 Id. at 696. 
 42 See id. at 697. 
 43 Id. at 702. 
 44 Id. at 703. 
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A short time later, the BLM delivered a more adequate explanation for 
the categorical exclusion.45 The court found that the agency’s explanation 
was not arbitrary and capricious.46 As a result, the district court granted 
summary judgment on this issue in favor of the defendants.47 
Unhappy with the district court’s ruling, the plaintiffs appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit.48 The plaintiffs first argued that the BLM was required to 
approve a new plan of operations due to the extended shutdown at Arizo-
na 1.49 Next, they claimed the issuance of the gravel permit, the obtainment 
of a new air quality control permit, and the approval of an updated reclama-
tion bond constituted “major federal action” triggering a new EIS under 
NEPA.50 Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that the categorical exclusion for the 
issuance of the gravel permit was arbitrary and capricious.51 The Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected each of the plaintiffs’ arguments and affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling.52 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) balances the nation’s 
interest in the environment with the social and economic needs of the coun-
try by mandating that federal policies, laws, and regulations be administered 
in accordance with the Act.53 Under NEPA, courts must ensure that federal 
agencies have taken a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of 
proposed “major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment.”54 By taking a “hard look,” federal agencies are re-
quired to accompany proposed actions with an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS), a detailed public statement that considers possible environmen-
tal harms and alternatives to the proposed action.55 While an EIS is required 
                                                                                                                           
 45 Order, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 791 F. Supp. 2d 687 (No. CV–09–8207–PCT–DGC), 
2011 WL 2550392, at *1 (order from district court judge dated June 27, 2011). 
 46 Order, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 791 F. Supp. 2d 687 (No. 09–08207–PHX–DGC), 2011 
WL 4709874, at *4 (order from district court judge dated Oct. 7, 2011). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1090. 
 49 Id. at 1091. 
 50 Id. at 1095. 
 51 See Federal Appellees’ Response Brief, supra note 22, at 57. 
 52 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1099. 
 53 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (2006); see also William Griffin, Comment, NEPA and the Roan 
Plateau: Forcing the Bureau of Land Management to Take a Hard Look, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 553, 558 (2013) (explaining that in enacting NEPA, Congress recognized humanity’s signifi-
cant effect on the environment). 
 54 E.g., Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
 55 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976). An envi-
ronmental impact statement must include “(1) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implement-
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before a project may commence, supplementation is sometimes required 
throughout the course of a project.56 Approval of specific projects might 
constitute “major federal action” under NEPA if the project has effects that 
may be major.57 NEPA regulations state that an EIS or a supplemental as-
sessment is required if “the agency makes substantial changes in the pro-
posed action” or “significant new circumstances or information relevant to 
environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action” arise.58 
While NEPA requires federal agencies to consider environmental im-
pacts in their planning and decision-making, the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (FLPMA) protects “the quality of scientific, scenic, his-
torical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and 
archeological values” by “prevent[ing] the unnecessary or undue degrada-
tion (“UUD”) of public lands.”59 FLPMA governs how the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) manages federal lands.60 Pursuant to FLPMA, the 
BLM is required to review mining operations on federal lands.61 The agen-
cy must approve a mine’s plan of operations and prepare an EIS to ensure 
that the mining project will not cause any UUD.62 FLPMA gives the Secre-
tary of the Interior (“Secretary”) authority to determine whether mining 
would result in UUD63 and establishes liability should the Secretary fail to 
prevent UUD of public lands.64 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), courts review the ac-
tions of federal agencies, including their duty to prepare EISs, to determine 
whether their conduct is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law.”65 In applying the “arbitrary and ca-
pricious” standard of review under the APA, courts are “exceedingly defer-
                                                                                                                           
ed, (3) alternatives to the proposed action, (4) the relationship between local short-term uses of 
man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (5) any 
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed 
action should it be implemented.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)–(v). 
 56 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.5, 1502.9(C)(1)(i)–(ii) (2013). 
 57 See id. § 1508.18. 
 58 Id. § 1502.9(C)(1)(i)–(ii). 
 59 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(8), 1732(b) (2006). In overseeing mining operations, the agency bal-
ances the nation’s interest in mining minerals against the need to protect ecological, environmental, 
and water resources. See id. § 1701(a)(8), (12). 
 60 See id. § 1732(b). 
 61 See id. 
 62 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006) (requiring an EIS), 43 C.F.R. § 3809.11(a) (2013) (requir-
ing a mine to gain approval from the BLM before conducting operations that are “greater than 
casual use”). 
 63 See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(5). 
 64 See Mineral Policy Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 42 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that the 
Secretary of the Interior not only has the authority under FLPMA to object to an environmentally 
harmful mining operation, but also the obligation to do so). 
 65 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2012). 
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ential” to the agency in conducting their analysis.66 The court presumes 
agency action to be valid if a “reasonable basis exist[s] for its decision.”67 
When reviewing an agency’s actions, courts are limited to the administra-
tive record of that particular agency.68 
Pursuant to BLM’s regulations under FLPMA (the “§ 3809 regula-
tions”),69 mining operators must submit a plan of operations to the BLM 
prior to developing a claim.70 Each plan of operations must include a “de-
scription of the equipment, devices, or practices” proposed to be used dur-
ing operations, including “maps of the project area,” “preliminary or con-
ceptual designs,” “interim management,” “plans for monitoring,” “a sched-
ule of anticipated periods of temporary closure,” and “other information if 
necessary to ensure [] operations will comply with [the regulations].”71 
Mining cannot commence before the BLM approves the plan and the opera-
tor obtains a financial guarantee.72 Moreover, the BLM cannot approve a 
plan unless the plan complies with NEPA and FLPMA by determining that 
the mining operation will not cause detrimental impacts to the environment 
or natural resources.73 
The § 3809 regulations also stipulate that each BLM-approved plan of 
operations contains an interim management plan,74 which must be adminis-
tered during periods of temporary cessation of mining activities.75 If a mine 
stops conducting operations for any period of time, it must follow the ap-
proved interim management plan.76 After five years of inactivity at a site, 
the BLM will review a mine’s operations and determine whether it should 
direct reclamation proceedings or allow the mine to continue operating un-
der its interim plan.77 The BLM may also decide to require a modification 
to a plan of operations where new concerns of UUD arise.78 A plan of oper-
ations becomes ineffective if mining operations stop79 or if the BLM sus-
                                                                                                                           
 66 E.g., Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 541 (11th Cir. 1996). 
 67 See Wash. State Farm Bureau v. Marshall, 625 F.2d 296, 302 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 68 See St. Joseph’s Hosp. Health Ctr. v. Blue Cross of Cent. N.Y., 489 F. Supp. 1052, 1062–63 
(N.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 69 See 43 C.F.R. § 3809.01 (2013). 
 70 See id. § 3809.11(a) (requiring an operator to submit a plan of operations before commenc-
ing a project “greater than casual use”). 
 71 Id. § 3809.401(b)(2)–(5), (c)(1)–(2). 
 72 See id. § 3809.412. 
 73 Id. §§ 3809.411(a)(3)(ii), 3809.415. 
 74 Id. §3809.401(b)(5). 
 75 Id. § 3809.424(a)(1) (2013). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. § 3809.424(a)(3)–(4). 
 78 Id. § 3809.431(b). 
 79 See id. § 3809.423 (stating the a plan of operations remains effective as long as an operator 
is conducting operations). The term “operations” as used in the regulation refers to: 
62 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41 E. Supp.:54 
pends or revokes a mining project.80 When a cessation of mining activities 
occurs, the Secretary has the authority to require reclamation of an aban-
doned site.81 In the event of a stoppage, suspension, or revocation, the 
mine’s operator must submit a new plan of operations for BLM approval82 
and a new EIS must be approved by the agency if recommencing operations 
would constitute “major federal action” pursuant to NEPA.83 
Prior to the enactment of the current § 3809 regulations in January 
2001, the regulations were promulgated in the Federal Register (“the prom-
ulgated regulations”), where public comments, proposals, changes to the 
rules, and the final version of the rules were published.84 The promulgated 
regulations considered several alternatives to the current regulations.85 One 
commenter suggested the BLM establish a fixed term after which a plan of 
operations would need to be reviewed, but the agency could not decide on a 
set duration due to the wide range in the size and types of mining opera-
tions.86 The BLM also considered suggestions to allow mining operations to 
remain inactive for a time period of three to ten years before terminating a 
plan of operations.87 Ultimately, these proposals were rejected and not in-
cluded in the § 3809 regulations that currently govern the BLM.88 
The § 3809 regulations do not require a plan of operations to be termi-
nated after five years, only that the BLM reviews the suspended mining 
                                                                                                                           
all functions, work, facilities, and activities on public lands in connection with pro-
specting, exploration, discovery and assessment work, development, extraction, and 
processing of mineral deposits locatable under the mining laws; reclamation of dis-
turbed areas; and all other reasonably incident uses, whether on a mining claim or 
not, including the construction of roads, transmission lines, pipelines, and other 
means of access across public lands for support facilities. 
Id. § 3809.5. 
 80 See id. § 3809.423; see also Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Man-
agement, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 70,054 (Nov. 21, 2000) (suggesting that an approved plan of opera-
tion retains financial value both to a mine’s current operator and a future operator despite the event 
of an ownership transfer). 
 81 See 43 C.F.R. § 3809.424(a)(4) (2013). Factors of abandonment include leaving “inopera-
ble or non-mining related equipment in the project area.” Id. § 3809.336(a). Abandonment can 
also occur if operators “remove equipment and facilities from the project area other than for pur-
poses of completing reclamation according to your reclamation plan, do not maintain the project 
area, discharge local workers, or there is no sign of activity in the project area over time.” Id. 
 82 See id. § 3809.424. 
 83 See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.3 (2013). 
 84 See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at 
69,998. 
 85 See id. 
 86 See id. at 70,053. 
 87 Id. at 70,054. 
 88 See id. at 70,054–55. 
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project to determine if it should conduct reclamation proceedings.89 A 
mine’s plan of operations “cannot be allowed to remain inactive and unre-
claimed indefinitely.”90 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Center for Biological Diversity v. Salazar, the U.S Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the Secretary of 
the Interior (“Secretary”) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) did 
not violate the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), or BLM’s own regulations.91 
The court held that the BLM was not required to approve a new plan of op-
erations before Denison Corporation resumed production at the Arizona 1 
Mine (“Arizona 1”) after a seventeen-year period of cessation.92 The court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the 1988 plan became ineffective after 
mining operations stopped in 1992.93 Relying on the regulations that govern 
the BLM under FLPMA (the “§ 3809 regulations”), the court explained that 
Arizona 1 was operating under its interim plan during the temporary clo-
sure,94 and a new plan of operations was not required when the mine re-
sumed operations under its originally approved plan.95 The court reasoned 
that an approved plan carries a financial value and the transferability of an 
approved plan of operations should be protected in the event of a temporary 
closure.96 
Next, the court held that a supplemental environmental impact state-
ment (EIS) was not required under NEPA after the mining operator sought 
to obtain a gravel permit, air quality control permit, and updated reclama-
tion bond.97 NEPA requires federal agencies to submit an EIS before taking 
“major federal action that significantly affects the quality of the human en-
vironment.”98 The court, however, was not persuaded by the plaintiffs’ ar-
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gument that obtainment of updated permits and bond constituted the requi-
site action that would trigger a supplemental EIS under NEPA.99 The court 
reasoned that because Arizona 1’s plan of operations was approved in 1988, 
there was no major federal action still pending.100 
Finally, after further explanation from the BLM for its decision, the 
court held that BLM’s invoking of the categorical exclusion from NEPA’s 
EIS requirement for the issuance of the gravel permit was not arbitrary and 
capricious.101 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the BLM 
granted the operators of Arizona 1 a free gravel source that would be used 
by the mine for a commercial purpose.102 It reasoned an agency is permitted 
to issue free use permits as long as it can show that the permit will not sole-
ly be used for a commercial or industrial purpose.103 The court reasoned that 
although Arizona 1 might benefit from the free use permit, members of the 
public would also benefit from the use of the public road, which provides a 
link to the region’s recreational and cultural sites.104 
Regardless of the environmental harms exposed by the decision, the 
Ninth Circuit came to the correct legal conclusion in Center for Biological 
Diversity v. Salazar.105 In reviewing the actions of the BLM, the court 
properly provided the agency with deference under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA).106 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ interpretation of the 
§ 3809 regulations, which the plaintiffs argued requires an operator to sub-
mit a new plan of operations for BLM approval when production resumes 
after a temporary cessation.107 Instead, the court accepted the agency’s in-
terpretation that the original plan remained effective, and it ruled that this 
interpretation was not “arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law.”108 
When the BLM approved Arizona 1’s original plan of operations in 
1988 and then prepared an EIS based on that plan, it complied with its du-
                                                                                                                           
 99 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 706 F.3d at 1095–96. 
 100 See id. 
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ties under FLPMA.109 The BLM took into account whether any “unneces-
sary or undue degradation” (UUD) would occur at the Arizona 1 mining 
project and concluded that such UUD was unlikely.110 Under the regulations, 
the Secretary is required to determine whether mining would cause UUD 
when a plan is submitted, not once activities resume after a temporary stop-
page.111 
Moreover, the BLM did carefully examine the environmental impacts 
at Arizona 1 in 1988.112 Denison’s predecessor submitted the plan of opera-
tions prior to conducting mining operations.113 Consequently, the BLM ex-
amined the environmental impacts of the Arizona 1 project and then pre-
pared an EIS before the operator commenced production at the mine.114 
While the mine was temporarily shut down, the BLM continued to monitor 
the site and ensured that it complied with the approved interim management 
plan.115 When operations resumed at Arizona 1, the BLM did not take any 
“major federal action,” since the mining site was still governed by the previ-
ously approved 1988 plan.116 The BLM properly complied with the § 3809 
regulations.117 
Despite the legal validity of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Center for 
Biological Diversity v. Salazar, the ruling exposes significant environmental 
loopholes in the § 3809 regulations for temporarily closed operations look-
ing to resume production.118 In the promulgated regulations, the BLM con-
sidered addressing the issue of permanently ceasing operations rather than 
allowing a mine to enter a lengthy standby and interim period.119 The BLM 
should consider amending the § 3809 regulations.120 
One recommendation in the promulgated regulations proposed closing 
a mine after a designated period of inactivity.121 In determining whether an 
amendment to the § 3809 regulations should be adopted, one must consider 
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Congress’s purpose of enacting FLPMA.122 Congress passed FLPMA for 
the purpose of preventing environmental harm to federal lands.123 It is es-
sential that federal lands are managed pursuant to regulations that are con-
sistent with Congress’s original intent.124 The agency could accomplish this 
pursuit by revisiting the comments published in the promulgated regula-
tions.125 
As suggested in the promulgated regulations, the § 3809 regulations 
could be amended so that after a certain period of inactivity at a site, the 
BLM would be required to begin reclamation.126 The agency would notify 
an operator that the mining operation would be deemed ready for closure, 
and the operator would have the opportunity to apply for an extension if 
there is a compelling reason to delay the closure.127 Currently, the BLM re-
views inactive mining operations after a period of five years of inactivity.128 
However in many instances, field officials are only able to conduct exterior 
inspections.129 Mine operators are able to maintain otherwise inactive mines 
with only a minimal amount of activity.130 Ultimately, the BLM should re-
consider proposed changes to the § 3809 regulations so that future harm to 
the environment can be prevented by shutting down abandoned mines such 
that reopening them will potentially require an EIS pursuant to NEPA.131 
CONCLUSION 
The susceptibility of the mining industry to economic fluctuations will 
likely result in miners continuing to abandon their claims during periods of 
low demand and returning, perhaps decades later, to resume operations dur-
ing the next uranium boom. With little enforcement power to prohibit min-
ers from returning to once-abandoned claims under current mining regula-
tions, the Bureau of Land Management must address regulatory issues that 
would make federal lands less susceptible to unnecessary or undue degrada-
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tion. Courts and lawmakers must not forget the original intention of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act and the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act and cannot continue to be persuaded by the economically moti-
vated mining industry. A failure to impose amended legislation is likely to 
make those drinking tap water from the Colorado River a little sick to their 
stomachs. 
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